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Gary Slapper 
 A WEAKNESS IN THE SYSTEM 
 
The case of Re J (a child)1 heard earlier this year by the Court of Appeal raises 
important questions about the adequacy of the current system of appeals. 
 
The case involved an eight-year old boy who, it was said, loves his mother and had 
regular contact with her until he was the subject of a "freeing order" made by a county 
court so that he could be adopted.  The case involved a hotly disputed claim that the 
mother was not suitably responsible for the demands of motherhood.  
 
At the heart of the legal debate is a very simple question: if the High Court can, 
through judicial review, invalidate earlier decisions of itself and lower courts where 
they are found to have been made in a procedurally improper way, and if the House of 
Lords can do the same thing in respect of its decisions, who has jurisdiction to review 
the Court of Appeal? If the answer is, as some might say, "no court can review the 
procedural work of the Court of Appeal" is that fair?   
 
The need for a fair system of appeal is paramount in any legal system reliant upon 
public confidence. As Lord Woolf, then Master of the Rolls, says in his seminal report 
on the modern civil justice system2: 
 
"An effective system of appeals is an essential part of a well-functioning system of 
civil justice. There can be no doubt about the importance of the availability of appeals 
to ensure that redress can be obtained for mistakes by a lower court…Save in 
exceptional cases, an individual who has grounds for dissatisfaction with the outcome 
of a case should in my view have at least the right to have his case looked at by a 
higher court, if only to consider whether to allow an appeal to proceed any further."  
 
The significance of this question is enhanced when one turns to the output of the 
Court of Appeal. The caseload is considerable.  In 1998, the last year for which 
figures are available, there were nearly 9,000 applications for leave to appeal in the 
Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal, and nearly 2,000 cases set down for a 
hearing in the Civil Division.3  Not only do these courts "legislate" on important 
points of ambiguous law, but also the sheer bulk of cases dealt with is substantial. 
 
After the freeing order had been made in Re J, the mother appealed to the Court of 
Appeal arguing that the county court judge had acted irrationally, ignoring the 
thoughts of the child and flying in the face of the medical expert evidence.  However, 
last July the Court of Appeal summarily refused permission for the appeal to be heard. 
 
The trouble is the Court of Appeal appeared to close the door on the appeal by 
applying the wrong test. Instead of asking the traditional question "are the grounds for 
appeal arguable?"4 they instead applied the stricter test "does the appeal stand a 
realistic chance of success?". 
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In February 2000, the mother went back to the Court of Appeal and applied for the 
July 1999 appeal decision to be set aside.  This application was rejected after a two-
hour hearing, in which the Court doubted whether the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 
applied in such family law cases. 
 
Rule 3.10 of the Civil Procedure Rules appears to give the Court of Appeal (Civil 
Division) the power to rectify mistakes. Surely, though, the Court of Appeal should be 
able to rectify errors in the way it dealt with an earlier case by setting aside the first 
decision? 
 
It was also argued that if Lord Hoffman had been sitting in the Court of Appeal when 
he gave judgement in the Pinochet5 case, the Court of Appeal could and should have 
set aside that decision in the same way that the House of Lords did.  She stated that if 
the Court of Appeal decides that it does not have jurisdiction to set aside a 
fundamentally flawed decision it will have the unique distinction among all British 
courts of having the power to deliver fundamentally defective judgements that cannot 
be domestically challenged.  The Court of Appeal stated that even if they did have 
jurisdiction to set aside an earlier decision on the grounds of procedural irregularity, 
the circumstances of the way Re J had been heard and appealed came "nowhere near" 
the level of  error needed before they would set aside a decision. 
 
There is another factor which aggravates this dispute.  If the mother's case prevailed it 
would mean that thousands of Court of Appeal decisions each year would be 
technically vulnerable to being reviewed.  In practice the real number of such claims 
would have to reflect hard evidence of procedural irregularity so there would, in all 
likelihood, be very few. 
 
Nonetheless, the Lord Chancellor's Department might be watching developments here 
very closely as the legal environment in which this appeal takes place is one in which 
the government has for economic reasons been keen to reduce the number of appealed 
cases. Indeed this has been legislated as section 55 of the Access to Justice Act 1999 
introduces the idea that, in general, only one appeal should be permitted in every case.  
The mother in Re J might well be wondering what happened to her chance of even 
one appeal. Through her eyes, permission to appeal was refused by a court on 
specious grounds and she was then told that that decision could not be challenged.  A 
disturbingly Kafkaesque plight.  
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